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The power grid defines one of the most important technological networks of our times and sustains
our complex society. It has evolved for more than a century into an extremely huge and seemingly
robust and well understood system. But it becomes extremely fragile as well, when unexpected,
usually minimal, failures turn into unknown dynamical behaviours leading, for example, to sudden
and massive blackouts. Here we explore the fragility of the European power grid under the effect
of selective node removal. A mean field analysis of fragility against attacks is presented together
with the observed patterns. Deviations from the theoretical conditions for network percolation (and
fragmentation) under attacks are analysed and correlated with non topological reliability measures.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05, 84.70.+p, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid defines, together with transportation
networks and the Internet, the most important class of
human-based web. It allows the success of advanced
economies based on electrical power but it also illus-
trates the limitations imposed by environmental con-
cerns, together with economic and demographic growth:
the power grid reaches its limits with an ever growing
demand [1]. A direct consequence of this situation is
the fragility of this energy infrastructure, as manifested
in terms of sudden blackouts and large scale cascading
failures, mostly caused by localized, small scale failures,
ocurring at an increasing frequency [2, 3].
The fragility of the power grid is an example of a gen-
eralized feature of most complex networks, from the In-
ternet to the genome [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Specifically, real net-
works are often characterized by a considerable resilience
against random removal or failure of individual units but
experience important shortcomings when the highly con-
nected elements are the target of the removal. Such di-
rected attacks have dramatic structural effects, typically
leading to network fragmentation [9, 10, 11, 12]. This
behaviour has been studied for skewed power-law distri-
butions of links, which are found in many small-world
networks [13, 14]. But recent studies have shown that
similar responses are not unique to small-world, scale-
free networks: power grids, having less skewed exponen-
tial degree distributions and often without small-world
topology, display similar patterns of response to node
loss. [15]
An additional feature of the power grid is its spatial
structure. The geographic character of this network im-
plies that a number of constraints are expected to be at
work. Other well known spatially extended nets include
the Internet [16], street networks [17], railroad and sub-
way networks [18], ant galleries [19], electric circuits [20]
or cortical graphs [21].
One fundamental aspect concerning the analysis of
complex networks is the increasing evidence of mutual
influence between dynamical behavior and topological
structure. The topology of human contact networks,
for example, determines the emergence of epidemics [22];
similarly, the correct dynamics in cellular networks are
rooted in the topology of the regulatory networks [23, 24].
Here we present evidence of a plausible relation between
topological and non topological reliability measures for
the power grid, suggesting that topology might be cap-
turing the robustness (or fragility) of the real system,
when dynamics are at work. This evidence has been ob-
tained analysing the resilience of 33 different power grids:
(a) the 23 different EU countries, (b) 4 geographically re-
lated zones (Iberian Peninsula, Ireland as island, England
as island and United Kingdom and Ireland as a whole),
(c) 4 traditionally united or separated regions (former
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovaquia and Federal and Democratic
Republics of Germany), (d) continental Europe and (e)
continental Europe plus United Kingdom and Ireland.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II the
data set on European power grids is presented and their
basic topological features summarized. In section III we
present both analytical and numerical estimations of the
boundaries for network collapse under attack, using a
mean field theoretical approach. Two classes of networks
are shown to be present. In section IV, evidence for cor-
relation between these two classes and non topological
reliability indexes is shown to exist. In section V we
summarize our findings and outline their implications.
II. POWER GRID DATA SETS
Europe’s electricity transport network is nowadays the
ensemble of more than twenty different national power
grids coordinated, at its higher level, by the Union for
the Co-ordination of Transmission Electricity, UCTE
(http://www.ucte.org). The distribution and location of
transmission lines, plants, stations, etc. can be found
in the last version (July 2007) of the UCTE Map. The
different data sets analyzed here have been obtained af-
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Figure 1: Power grids define a spatial, typically planar graph with nodes including generators, transformers and substations.
Here we show (a) the geographical and (b) the topological organization of the Italian power grid. These webs are homogeneous,
having an exponential degree distribution, P (k) = exp(−k/γ)/γ as shown in (c).
ter introducing the topological values (i.e. geographical
positions and longitudes) of more than 3,000 generators
and substations (nodes) and 200,000 km of transmission
lines (edges) in a geographical information system (GIS).
The national power grid for every country or region has
been obtained from a typical GIS query: the selection
of the part of the UCTE’s network constrained by every
country’s frontier. The power grid can then be formally
described in terms of a graph Ω = (V,E). Here V = {vi}
indicates the set of N nodes (transformers, substations or
generators in our context). Figure 1 shows an example of
such graphs with its geographical (a) and topological (b)
structures, respectively. These nodes can be connected,
and E = {eij} indicates the set of actual links between
pairs of nodes. Specifically, eij = {vi, vj} indicates that
energy is being transported between the nodes in the pair
{vi, vj}. Our system can be analyzed at two main levels:
the whole power grid ΩEU including all countries within
the EU and at the country level. If Ωk indicates the k-th
power grid of one of the n = 33 countries and regions
involved, we have ΩEU =
⋃n
k=1 Ωk.
The global organization of these webs has been pre-
viously analyzed [15], revealing a very interesting set of
common regularities: (a) most of them are small worlds
(i.e. very short path lengths are tipically present) and
the larger webs display clustering coefficients much larger
than expected from a random version of the network
analysed; (b) they are very sparse, meaning that the av-
erage number of links is such that 〈k〉 ≪ N , with an
average of 〈k〉 = 2.8 over all the webs available (see
Table I); (c) the link distribution is exponential: the
probability of having a node linked to k other nodes is
P (k) = exp(−k/γ)/γ (Fig. 1, c) and (d) these networks
are weakly or no correlated. This exponential distribu-
tion is thus characterized by the constant γ which actu-
ally corresponds to the average degree (i.e., 〈k〉 = γ).
Correlations were measured using the average nearest
neighbor connectivity of a node with the degree k, i. e.
the average 〈knn〉 =
∑
k′ k
′P (k′|k) where P (k′|k) is the
conditional probability that a link belonging to a node
with connectivity k points to a node with connectivity
k′ [25]. For these webs, it was found that 〈knn〉 ≈ con-
stant, as expected if no correlations were present. This is
a very useful property in our analysis, since makes mean
field predictions valid in spite that we ignore the planar
character of these networks, thus replacing the geograph-
ical pattern by a topological one.
III. ATTACKS IN EXPONENTIAL NETWORKS:
MEAN FIELD THEORY
In our previous paper, we analysed the effects of both
random and selective removal of nodes on the EU grids
[15]. Nonetheless, in that paper we were mostly inter-
ested in the average behavior of the networks analysed
(see Figure 2). Here we want to extend these results to
the analysis of the differences observed in EU power grids
with the goal of interpreting the different patterns exhib-
ited compared to the predictions from mean field theory
on intentional attacks.
In order to compute the effect of random removal
of nodes, we compute the percolation condition for the
graph assuming it is sparse and uncorrelated. Let f be
the fraction of removed nodes and P (k) the link degree
distribution of our graph. The damaged graph will be
characterized by the following degree distribution P(k):
P(k) =
∞∑
i>k
(
i
k
)
f i−k(1 − f)kP (k) (1)
Note that such an equation corresponds to the case
when a fraction f of nodes are removed but it also holds
when a fraction f of links are removed (or lead to unoc-
cupied sites).
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Figure 2: Effects of attacks and failures on the topology of the
EU power grids. Static tolerance to random (white circles)
and selective (black circles) removal of a fraction f of nodes,
measured by the relative size Sinf of the largest connected
component. Whiskers stand for the standard deviation. In-
set: Evolution of the static tolerance to random and selective
node removal for Italy (dashed lines) and France (continous
lines). Though in the case of random removal (failures) both
networks exhibit a similar response, for the selective one (at-
tacks), Italy behaves in a slightly stronger manner (i.e., for
a fixed fraction of eliminated nodes, the relative size of the
largest connected component in Italy remains always higher
than that of France).
In order to study percolation properties, we use the
standard generating function methodology. The two first
generating functions of the damaged graph are:
F0(x) =
∞∑
k
P (k)(1 − f)xk (2)
F1(x) =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k
kP (k)(1 − f)xk−1 (3)
The averages (i.e., the values at x = 1) are F0(1) =
F1(1) = 1 − f respectively. Here F0(1) is the fraction of
nodes from the original graph belonging to the damaged
graph. Similarly, F1(1) is the relation among 〈k〉 and
the average number of nodes from V that can be reached
after deleting a fraction f of nodes. The generating func-
tion for the size of the components, other than the giant
one, which can be reached from a randomly choosen node
is:
H1(x) = f + xF1(H1(x)) (4)
And the generating function for the size of the component
to which a randomly choosen node belongs to is [26]:
H0(x) = f + xF0(H1(x)) (5)
Thus, the average component size, other than the giant
component will be:
〈s〉 = H ′
0
(1) = 1− f + F ′
0
(1)×H ′
1
(1) (6)
After some algebra, we see that this leads to a singular-
ity when F ′
1
(1) = 1. To ensure the percolation of the
damaged graph, the following inequality has to hold:
∑
k
k(k − 2)P (k) >
∑
k
k(k − 1)fP (k) (7)
The above expression can be expressed as:
〈k2〉 − 2〈k〉 > f(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉) (8)
which leads to a critical probability of node removal fc
given by:
fc = 1−
1
κ0 − 1
(9)
where κ0 = 〈k
2〉/〈k〉. In our case, we have an analytic
estimate κ0 = 2γ. Using the average value 〈γ〉 = 1.9, we
obtain a predicted critical probability fc = 0.61.
Although random removal is an interesting scenario,
it considers chance events that are not correlated to net-
work structure. Intentional attacks strongly deviate from
random failures: even a small fraction of removed nodes
having large degrees has dramatic consequences. In order
to predict the effects of such directed attacks on network
structure, the critical probability associated to network
breakdown can be computed. Here we follow the for-
malism developed by Cohen et al. [27]. Roughly speak-
ing, this formalism enables us to translate an intentional
attack into an equivalent random failure and study the
problem in terms of standard percolation using equation
(9). When the selective removal of the most connected
nodes is considered, a fraction of order O(1/N) is re-
moved by eliminating elements with a degree larger than
a given k = K. This upper cutoff is then easily computed
from the continuous approximation:
∞∑
K
P (k) ≈
∫
∞
K
1
γ
e−k/γdk =
1
N
(10)
and the new cutoff K˜ can be obtained (again under a
continuous approximation) from:
∫ K˜
K
1
γ
e−k/γdk =
∫
∞
K
1
γ
e−k/γdk −
1
N
= p (11)
which gives (assuming K large enough) a new cutoff:
K˜ = −γ ln p (12)
4Following [27], we translate the problem of intentional
attack to an equivalent random failure problem. The
removal of a fraction f of nodes with the highest de-
gree is then equivalent to the random removal of those
links connecting the remaining nodes to those already re-
moved. Thus, the probability that a specific link leads to
a deleted node will be given by:
p˜ =
∫ K˜
K
kP (k)
〈k〉
dk (13)
being 〈k〉 the average degree of the undamaged graph. It
is not difficult to show that this gives:
p˜ =
(
K˜
γ
+ 1
)
e−K˜/γ (14)
Using equation (12) it is straightforward to see that:
p˜ = (ln pc − 1)pc (15)
where we assume that K is large enough to ignore the
term exp(−K/γ). Thus, an equivalent network with
maximal degree K˜ has been built after a random removal
of p˜ nodes due to the fact that the absence of correlations
implies a random failure of links. In order to obtain the
degree distribution of the damaged graph, such a fail-
ure can be introduced into equation (3). But this will
be formally equivalent to the removal of p˜ nodes. Thus,
to study stability properties, we only need the resulting
probability p˜ to be introduced in the critical condition
for percolation (9). Replacing pc = p˜, we obtain:
1 + (ln pc − 1)pc =
1
2γ − 1
(16)
whose solutions (for each fixed γ) provide the conditions
for network percolation under attacks. In Figure 3 and
Table I, we show the result of our calculations. As ex-
pected, a much lower value of fc is required to break a
power grid network through intentional attack.
Now we can compare this mean field prediction, eval-
uated as f theorc , with available data. Using the whole
dataset of EU grids, we can estimate f realc for all EU
countries. The result are shown, for both fc’s, in Fig-
ure 3, b. As we can see, there is a very good agreement
(given their small size) between observed (real) and pre-
dicted (theoretical) fc values, but some nontrivial devia-
tions are also obvious. We can see that aproximately for
γ > 1.5 the expected fc values are very similar to those
predicted by theory. However, the power grids having
lower exponents (when γ < 1.5) strongly deviate from
the predicted values. These agreements and deviations
are not due to some simple statistical trait, such as net-
work size. As indicated in Table I, very large power grids
are in both sides (i.e, the German and Italian grids are
in the first group whereas the Spanish and French ones,
belong to the second).
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Figure 3: (a) Phase space for exponential uncorrelated net-
works under random removal of nodes and directed attack
towards highly connected vertices. Here γ is the average de-
gree of the exponential network and fc indicates the fraction
of removed nodes required in order to break the network into
many pieces. The upper curve is the critical boundary for
network percolation under random removal of nodes. Below
it, a network experiencing such random failures would remain
connected (i. e. with a giant component). The lower curve
corresponds to the critical boundary for attacks. In (b) we
display the estimated values of fc(γ) for attacks from the
thirty-three EU power grids (circles) to be compared with
the mean field prediction (continuous line).
IV. CORRELATIONS WITH
NON-TOPOLOGICAL RELIABILITY MEASURES
The reliability of a power grid evaluates its ability to
continuously meet demand under major events like over-
loads, general failures, external impacts and alike. At the
engineering level, and due to the different dimensions of
service quality involved in a power grid (i.e., consumers,
companies and regulators), reliability has been tradition-
ally measured by different indexes as (a) the amount of
energy not supplied, (b) the total loss of power or (c)
the equivalent time of interruption, which measures the
number and duration of interruptions experienced by cus-
tomers [28]. In this sense we would expect a correlation
between the critical percolation fraction fc, the exponent
that characterizes the grids’ cumulative degree distribu-
5Errors Attacks
Country γ f theorc f
real
c |∆fc| f
theor
c f
real
c |∆fc| N L < k >
Belgium 1,005 0,011 0,395 0,384 0,010 0,131 0,121 53 58 2,18
Holland 1,086 0,147 0,387 0,240 0,034 0,126 0,092 36 38 2,11
Germany 1,237 0,322 0,565 0,243 0,097 0,229 0,132 445 560 2,51
Italy 1,238 0,322 0,583 0,261 0,097 0,241 0,144 272 368 2,70
Austria 1,409 0,450 0,506 0,056 0,159 0,191 0,032 70 77 2,20
Rumania 1,418 0,455 0,579 0,124 0,162 0,238 0,076 106 132 2,49
Greece 1,457 0,477 0,492 0,015 0,174 0,183 0,009 27 33 2,44
Croatia 1,594 0,543 0,525 0,018 0,214 0,202 0,012 34 38 2,23
Portugal 1,606 0,548 0,595 0,047 0,217 0,250 0,033 56 72 2,57
EU 1,630 0,557 0,629 0,072 0,223 0,275 0,052 2783 3762 2,70
Poland 1,641 0,562 0,594 0,033 0,226 0,249 0,023 163 212 2,60
Slovakia 1,660 0,569 0,563 0,006 0,231 0,227 0,004 43 52 2,41
Bulgaria 1,763 0,604 0,570 0,034 0,256 0,232 0,024 56 67 2,39
Switzerland 1,850 0,629 0,610 0,020 0,275 0,260 0,015 147 186 2,53
Czech Republic 1,883 0,638 0,634 0,004 0,281 0,279 0,003 70 88 2,51
France 1,895 0,641 0,647 0,006 0,285 0,289 0,004 667 899 2,69
Hungary 1,946 0,654 0,617 0,036 0,295 0,266 0,029 40 47 2,35
Bosnia 1,952 0,655 0,588 0,067 0,295 0,244 0,052 36 42 2,33
Spain 2,008 0,668 0,689 0,020 0,307 0,324 0,017 474 669 2,82
Serbia 2,199 0,705 0,655 0,051 0,339 0,296 0,054 65 81 2,49
Table I: A summary of the basic features exhibited by some of the European power grids analyzed, ordered by increasing γ,
the exponential degree distribution exponent. The critical probability of node removal fc is shown for both cases, theoretical
and real, and random (errors) and selective (attacks) removal of nodes. The absolute difference |∆fc| between theoretical and
observed critical probability diminishes as γ increases in general terms. Number of nodes N , number of links L and mean
degree < k > are also shown as reference. Countries in italics have been used to evaluate reliability indexes. EU results (i.e.,
results for the ΩEU graph) are shown for comparative purposes.
tion γ, and some of (if not all) these reliability indexes
presented.
In order to explore the problem, three reliability in-
dexes have been obtained from the UCTE monthly re-
liability measures [29]. They are related to four major
events. Namely: overloads, general failures, external im-
pacts and exceptional conditions, and finally other rea-
sons (including unknown reasons). For every major event
and transmission grid, the following indexes have been
considered and normalized: (1) energy not supplied, nor-
malized by the gross UCTE electricity consumption; (2)
total loss of power, normalized by the UCTE peak load
on the third Wednesday of December; and (3) equivalent
time of interruption (also known as average interruption
time or AIT), which is the ratio between the total energy
not supplied and the average power demand per year,
measured in minutes per year (normalized by definition).
In order to avoid statistical deviations due to the lim-
ited historical data available (UCTE monthly statistics
have been published only from January 2002 onwards),
we have devided UCTE networks in two groups. Group 1
includes those countries whose critical breakdown proba-
bility f realc agrees with that predicted f
theor
c (i.e., coun-
tries with γ > 1.5). Group 2 includes those countries
whose f realc deviates positively from f
theor
c (i.e., coun-
tries with γ < 1.5), with an expected more robust topol-
ogy than that predicted.
Figure 4 gives the acummulated percentage values for
the formerly presented reliability indexes and for each
group of networks. As we can see, networks in group
1 (i.e., networks with f realc
∼= f theorc ) represent 63% of
the whole UCTE nodes, they manage 48 and 51% of the
UCTE energy and power respectively but acummulate
85, 68 and 79% of the UCTE average interruption time,
power loss and energy not delivered, respectively. On
the contrary, though networks in group 2 (i.e., networks
with f realc > f
theor
c ) represent a mere 33% of the whole
UCTE nodes, they manage 46 and 44% of the UCTE en-
ergy and power respectively (similar to those of group 1)
but, even so, they acummulate only 15, 32 and 21% of
the UCTE average interruption time, power loss and en-
ergy not delivered, respectively. This fact would suggest
a positive correlation between static topological robust-
ness and non-topological reliability measures and, as a
consequence, a clear diferentiation between two classes
of networks in terms of their level of robustness.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have extended our previous work on
the robustness of the European power grid under random
failures with the intentional attacks scenario. A mean
field theory approach has been used in order to analiti-
cally predict the fragility of the networks against selec-
tive removal of nodes and a significant deviation from
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Figure 4: Power grid indexes vs. reliability indexes. (a) Net-
works in group 1 (i.e., γ > 1.5 and fc ∼= fc,p), though rep-
resent two thirds of the UCTE size, share almost as much
power and energy as networks in group 2 (i.e., γ < 1.5 and
fc > fc,p). (b) Nonetheless, these same networks of group
1 acummulate more than five times the average interruption
time (AIT) of the latter, more than two times their power
losses and almost four times their undelivered energy.
predicted values has been found for power grids with an
exponent γ < 1.5. For these networks, the real critical
fraction f realc is higher than the theoretical one f
theor
c
for the same γ. This suggests an increased robustness
for these networks compared to those with γ > 1.5.
In order to evaluate the real existence of this two
classes of networks, namely robust and fragile, real relia-
bility measures from the Union for the Co-Ordination of
Transport of Electricity (UCTE) have been used. It has
been found that there seems to exist indeed a positive
correlation between static topological robustness mea-
sures and real non-topological reliability measures. This
correlation shows that networks in the robust class (i.e.,
networks with f realc > f
theor
c ), though representing only
33% of the UCTE nodes under study and managing a
similar amount of power and energy than that of the
networks in the fragile class, acummulate much less per-
centage of the whole UCTE average interruption time,
power loss and energy not delivered. How this can be
related with the internal topological structure of the net-
works and the subgraphs abundances is actually a main
point under study and will be explored elsewhere.
This feature is of obvious importance. Up to this date
and as far as we know, no such correlation between topo-
logical and dynamical features has been encountered in
any study related to complex networks structure and dy-
namics. From the power industry point of view, con-
stanly facing the challenge of meeting growing demands
with security of supply at the lowest possible spendi-
ture in infrastructures, the implications of this feature
would permit new rather than traditional approaches to
contingency-based planning criteria [30]. One of these
traditional, and widely used, planning criteria is the so-
called (N−X) criterion. It assumes that no interruption
of service can occur in a system with N units of equip-
ment due to isolation of X outaged components. With-
out any topological feedback, the (N −X) methodology
(a) requires fast breaker operation to open any circuit
pathway that has been faulted as well as to close the al-
ternate path to service and (b) pushes the system to an
increasing interconnection complexity as its utilization
ratio (i.e., ratio between peak load and capacity of sub-
transmission lines and substation transformers) increases
in time (aging infrastructures). Though aging infrastruc-
tures, excessive power delivered through increasing long
distances and other possible causes may influence the in-
creasing fragility of the power grids, it seems reasonable
to think that, on a topological basis, the application of
the (N−X) contingency-based criteria, though originally
intended to avoid interruptions in power service, would
difficult, at the same time, the islanding of disturbances
(i.e., the more connected an element is, the easier would
be for a disturbance to reach). In other words: the same
criteria that successfully has served to increase reliabil-
ity in power systems through the late 20th century might
now be responsible for the difficulties encountered in pre-
venting perturbations, blackouts or isolating the different
power grid elements.
Over the last years, and mainly due to economic im-
peratives, contingency-based planning criteria has been
gradually pervaded by reliability-based planning criteria.
In the later, the prevention of likely contingencies of se-
vere impact is considered much more effective than that
of low-probability and low impact. Nonetheless, this fact
leaves the main conception of (N −X) criteria still valid
and at work in most of the ongoing grid’s planning pro-
cesses. Following the former discussion, we would suggest
to add a third topology-based planning methodology, in
order to take this fact into account.
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